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The Benefits of Deregulation 
by Murray Weidenbaum 
The deregulation of American transporta-
tion, telecommunications, energy, and finan-
cial markets over the past 10 years has been 
a triumph of ideas over entrenched political 
interests. For 90 years-from the establish-
ment of the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion in 1886 to the passage of the Toxic 
Substances Control Act in 1976-government 
regulation of American economic activity 
continuously expanded, and created in its 
wake powerful constituencies who benefited 
from the regulation. 
Yet this trend in government rule-making 
has changed dramatically and perhaps irrevo-
cably during the past decade, resulting in 
remarkable benefits for the American econ-
omy. Deregulation has lowered the cost of pro-
ducing goods and services. It has offered a 
wider array of choices to the American con-
sumer. And it has substantially bolstered the 
international competitiveness of our economy. 
What caused the shift toward deregulation 
was not a realignment of political forces. The 
most significant developments were sup-
ported by a bipartisan coalition in both the 
legislative and executive branches of the fed-
eral government. Consumer activists such as 
Ralph Nader offered support at vital points, 
as did leaders of both political parties, 
including Presidents Ford and Carter and 
Senator Edward Kennedy. But the most 
important role was played by a very unusual 
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set of actors in the public policy arena: econ-
omists, political scientists, legal scholars, 
and similar purveyors of ideas. 
Intellectual Support 
Three streams of economic research and 
policy analysis dealing with different aspects 
of regulation reached a confluence in the 
early 1970s. The first, and most substantial, 
focused on the heavy and widely distributed 
burdens that economic regulation imposed 
on the economy, especially in the field of 
transportation, and the smaller and far more 
concentrated distribution of any resulting 
benefits. The second research effort dealt 
with the fundamental nature of the r~gula­
tory process, especially the relationships 
between regulators and those regulated. The 
third area of research focused on the general 
costs of regulation, especially to the con-
sumer. 
It is difficult to pinpoint the exact start of 
the influential research that led to transpor-
tation deregulation, but The Economics of 
Competition in the Transportation Industries, 
written by John R. Meyer, et al. in 1959, was 
a landmark study. Important work followed 
on each of the major modes of transporta-
tion, notably George W. Douglas and James 
C. Miller, III on airlines, and Thomas Gale 
Moore on trucking. 
The airline industry provided the clearest 
examples of the heavy cost of regulation, par-
ticularly the price differences for trips on 
regulated and non-regulated airlines. Inter-
state travel was under the jurisdiction of the 
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB); intrastate tra-
vel was beyond the CAB's purview. Research 
found that a traveler could fly 500 miles 
from San Diego to San Francisco in the 
unregulated California market and pay less 
than someone flying 300 miles from Port-
land, Oregon to Seattle, Washington under 
the CAB's control. 
Most American economists writing in this 
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field also had concluded during the 1970s 
that Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) 
regulation was protecting the carriers (rail-
roads, truckers, and their unions) while 
increasing costs to shippers by billions of 
dollars a year. Comparable studies were 
made of other regulated industries, such as 
radio, television, and utilities. 
A consensus gradually emerged. Transpor-
tation regulation in the United States did not 
protect its purported beneficiaries, con-
sumers, but instead was designed to benefit 
the employees, executives, and shareholders 
of the companies being regulated. Govern-
ment rule-making shielded entrenched firms 
from potential new competitors and kept a 
high price umbrella over the regulated indus-
try. 
Transportation regulation did not protect 
consumers, but instead benefited the 
employees, executives, and shareholders 
of the companies being regulated. 
The second, and related, stream of 
research focused on the political efforts of 
interest groups that benefited from regula-
tion. Political scientist Marver Bernstein pre-
sented in 1955 a basic "capture" theory of 
regulation. As the only political force in the 
regulatory agency's environment with any 
stability, the industry eventually forced the 
agency to accommodate its needs. George 
Stigler and Sam Peltzman generalized this 
theory, contending that regulatory policy 
reflects the interests and the power of the 
concerned groups, not necessarily the con-
sumer's. In 1982, Stigler was awarded the 
Nobel Prize in Economics for his seminal 
articles on the theory of regulation and his 
empirical studies of the effect of regulation 
on specific industries. 
The third line of research-focusing on 
costs to consumers-saw the topic move 
3 
from the business pages and academic jour-
nals to the front pages and the nightly news. 
The American Enterprise Institute (AEI) led 
the way in the mid-1970s with several widely 
cited reports on the high cost of regulation, 
among them my own Government-Mandated 
Price Increases, Sam Peltzman's Regulation 
of Pharmaceutical Innovation, John P. 
Gould's Davis Bacon Act, and Rita Ricardo-
Campbell's Food Safety and Regulation. In 
1977, AEI began publishing a bimonthly jour-
nal, Regulation, that is devoted entirely to 
government rule-making. The issue hit a 
responsive chord with the media, influential 
policy groups, and finally the Congress. 
Deregulation gave policy-makers an 
opportunity to curb escalating inflation 
without trading off jobs. 
A few simple concepts made the issue 
attractive. Deregulation presented policy-
makers with an opportunity to curb escalat-
ing inflation in a way that did not involve a 
tradeoff with jobs. Indeed, reduced regula-
tion would cut both costs and barriers to 
production and employment. 
The burdens of regulation were character-
ized as a hidden tax on the consumer ($63 bil-
lion in 1976 for a sample of federal regulatory 
programs, according to estimates by Robert 
De Fina and me). This cost increase was bur-
ied in the form of higher prices but it was very 
real and often regressive. 
Cost-benefit analysis-which had been 
used to screen out clearly uneconomical 
expenditure projects for decades-also 
proved to be useful when applied to regula-
tion. Although the implementation required 
dealing with many difficult conceptual and 
statistical problems, the general notion of 
weighing costs against benefits generated a 
positive reaction. 
Carefully researched examples of regula-
tory silliness brought these concepts to the 
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public's attention. Perhaps the first was the 
dead haul-the numerous requirements that 
resulted in trucks returning empty from 
delivery even though there was ample oppor-
tunity to fill them wi~h cargo. The public 
needed no great expertise in industrial orga-
nization to resent the waste that resulted. 
This unusual form of applied research con-
centrated increasingly on the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration. OSHA 
jokes (based on that research) became a sta-
ple of business conversation. Is it true that 
OSHA made one company build separate 
"his" and "her" toilets even though the only 
two employees of the firm were married to 
each other? Did OSHA really issue a bulletin 
to farmers telling them to be careul around 
cows and not to step into manure pits? Both 
of those questions could, quite accurately, be 
answered in the affirmative. 
By the late 1970s, support for regulatory 
reform had become widespread. It included 
business executives who found themselves 
inundated with a flood of rules to follow and 
reports to file, lawyers and political scientists 
who thought that the regulatory agencies 
often were captured by the regulated indus-
tries, and economists who believed that regu-
lation reduced competition and increased 
costs. Congressional hearings on the subject 
yielded support for less regulation from such 
disparate groups-and surprising allies-as 
the American Conservative Union and the 
Consumer Federation of America. 
Ten Years of Progress 
Progress on deregulation built up slowly 
but gathered strong momentum in the mid 
and late 70s. In 1968, the Supreme Court 
decision permitted non-AT&T equipment to 
be hooked into the Bell telephone system. In 
the following year, the Federal Communica-
tions Commission (FCC) allowed a non-Bell 
company to connect its long-distance net-
s 
work with local phone systems. Although 
these two actions attracted little attention at 
the time, they triggered the forces that led to 
the breakup of the Bell system. 
In the 1970s, interest rates on deposits of 
$100,000 and over were deregulated. Again, 
one move toward deregulation ultimately led 
to another. As securities firms took advan-
tage of that "loophole," banks responded. A 
process was set in motion that has resulted 
in the lifting of interest rate ceilings, the pay-
ment of interest on consumer demand 
deposits, and greater competition among 
financial institutions. 
Two important regulatory changes took 
place in 1975. The Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) ordered an end to the 
practice of fixed brokerage fees for stock 
market transactions, and the ICC prohibited 
rate bureaus for both trucking firms and 
railroads from protesting independent rate 
filings by members. Clearly, the regulatory 
ice was breaking. 
In 1977, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), 
led by two economists, chairman Alfred 
Kahn and member Elizabeth Bailey, insti-
tuted several changes that ultimately led to 
deregulation. The CAB gave airlines 
increased freedom in pricing and easier 
access to routes not previously served. The 
results were spectacular. Fares for tourists 
fell sharply, planes filled, and airline profits 
soared. The CAB experiences provided a 
striking example of how regulation had been 
hurting the traveling public; in response, a 
bipartisan coalition in Congress passed legis-
lation in 1978 that phased out the CAB and 
its authority to control entry and prices. 
The year 1980 was an eventful one for dereg-
ulation. The FCC eliminated most federal regu-
lation of cable television. Economist Darius 
Gaskins became chairman of the ICC and econ-
omist Marcus Alexis was appointed a member 
of the Commission. That, in turn, "encour-
aged" the trucking industry to support con-
gressional leadership of reform in this field, in 
the expectation that the results would be less 
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LANDMARKS IN DEREGULATION 
1968 Supreme Court permits non-AT&T equipment 
to be hooked up to Bell System. 
1969 MCI is allowed to connect its long distance 
network with local phone systems. 
1970 Interest rates on deposits of $100,000 and over 
are deregulated. 
1972 FCC sets domestic satellite open skies policy. 
1975 SEC ends fixed brokerage fees for stock mar-
ket transactions. 
Rate bureaus for trucking firms and railroads 
are prohibited from protesting independent 
rate filings. 
1977 Air cargo is deregulated; airlines are given 
more freedom in pricing and easier access to 
new rates. 
1978 Congress partially decontrols natural gas. 
OSHA revokes 928 "nitpick" rules. 
CAB is phased out, ending its control over air-
line entry and prices. 
EPA begins emissions trading policy. 
1980 FCC eliminates most federal regulation of 
cable TV and of consumer premises equip-
ment. 
Motor Carrier Act removes barriers for new 
entries and lets operators establish fares and 
routes with little ICC interference. 
Depository Institutions law phases out inter-
est rate ceilings and permits S&Ls to offer 
interest-bearing checking accounts. 
Staggers Rail Act enables railroads to adjust 
rates without government approval and to 
enter into contracts with shippers. 
1981 President Reagan decontrols crude oil prices 
and petroleum allocations. 
FCC eliminates much radio regulation . 
1982 New bus regulatory statute allows intercity 
bus companies to change routes and fares . 
Garn-St. Germain Act allows S&Ls to make 
more commercial and consumer loans and 
removes interest rate differentials between 
banks and S&Ls. 
1984 AT&T agrees to divest local operating compan-
ies as part of antitrust settlement. 
Individual ocean shipping companies allowed 
to offer lower rates and better service than 
shipping conference. 
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drastic than desired by the ICC. Later in the 
year, a new trucking law provided much more 
pricing freedom to individual truckers, made 
entry into the market much easier, and elimi-
nated many costly ICC restrictions-but the 
ICC presence was retained. Also passed in 
1980, the Staggers Rail Act gave the railroads 
new pricing freedom. 
In 1981, the executive branch took the lead 
on regulatory reform. Building on the 
groundwork of the Ford and Carter Adminis-
trations, President Reagan issued a new exec-
utive order directing the regulatory agencies 
under his jurisdiction to perform cost-
benefit analyses prior to issuing new rules. A 
formal review process was placed under the 
auspices of the Office of Management and 
Budget. Also, a hold was placed on the 
numerous "midnight" rules that the Carter 
Administration had tried to rush through in 
its final weeks. As a result of these efforts, 
the rapid rate of regulatory issuances in the 
70s substantially decelerated in the 80s. 
Progress toward deregulation was made in 
other areas as well. The FCC eliminated 
much regulation of the radio industry. Presi-
dent Reagan decontrolled crude oil prices 
and petroleum allocations, and quietly termi-
nated the Council on Wage and Price Stabil-
ity. 
But the pace of deregulation slowed signifi-
cantly after 1981. AI though regulatory reform 
was one of the four original pillars of 
Reaganomics (along with tax reduction, 
budget cutting, and anti-inflationary mone-
tary restraint), it never received as high a pri-
ority as the other three. A backlash in the 
environmental area (fueled in part by the con-
troversial personalities of some of the Admin-
istration's appointees) put the entire reg-
ulatory reform movement on the defensive. 
Nevertheless, progress continued to be 
made. Banking legislation enacted in 1982 
allowed savings and loan associations to 
make more commercial and consumer loans. 
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The interest rate differentials between banks 
and thrift institutions also were removed. 
The Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982 
permitted bus companies to change routes 
and fares. In 1984, the Shipping Act enabled 
individual ocean shipping companies to offer 
lower rates and better service than shipping 
"conferences:' Also in that year, AT&T agreed 
to divest local operating companies as part 
of its historic antitrust settlement in the Jus-
tice Department. 
In one key area-the regulation of foreign 
trade-substantial backsliding has occurred. 
Since 1981, the Reagan Administration has 
renewed or extended restrictions on the 
import of automobiles, meat, motorcycles, 
sugar, steel, textiles and many other prod-
ucts. Simultaneously, control over exports-
often justified on foreign policy or national 
security grounds-has been tightened. The 
Administration does not seem to understand 
fully that deregulation is a concept as rele-
vant to foreign trade as it is to the domestic 
economy. 
In environmental and safety rule-making, 
wholesale deregulation has not been the 
reformers' goal. The emphasis here has been 
on relating the costs of regulation to their 
benefits and thus reducing the economic bur-
dens of the regulatory process. Responding 
to the critics of its regulatory approach, 
OSHA eliminated or modified 928 of its "nit-
picking" rules. EPA experimented with "bub-
ble" and "offset" policies designed to give 
companies more flexibility in complying 
with environmental standards. 
In the case of OSHA and EPA policies, the 
courts have often been barriers to the adop-
tion of more economically efficient regula-
tions. For example, in 1981 a federal court 
ruled out cost-benefit tests performed for a 
proposed cotton dust standard because it 
held that the law did not provide for basing 
OSHA rulings on economic criteria. Never-
theless, the increasing support for reviewing 
the costliness and desirability of proposed 
new regulations-an approach started by 
9 
President Ford, continued under President 
Carter, and expanded under President 
Reagan-has clearly slowed down the pace of 
federal rule-making. 
Consumer Protection 
The general impact of deregulation on the 
American economy has been extremely posi-
tive. Diminished government intervention has 
expanded the role of competition and market 
forces. Virtually every study of the changes 
has concluded that the results have been 
lower costs, increased demand, and new 
opportunities for both producers and con-
sumers of the previously regulated activities. 
In the case of airlines, competition has 
been especially rigorous; 26 new carriers 
entered between 1978-85 and 19 have exited. 
This has exerted great downward pressure 
on labor and overhead costs. Airline produc-
tivity has risen, average air fares have 
declined and volume is sharply up. The num-
ber of city pairs served by more than one air-
line increased by 55 percent from 1979 to 
1984. While some passengers no longer have 
direct flights, the proportion of passengers 
changing planes actually decreased from 27 
percent in 1978 to 25 percent in 1984. 
Moreover, despite several highly-publicized 
crashes and near-misses, the overall record 
of airline safety has improved since deregula-
tion. The accident rate declined 26 percent-
from the average during 1972-78 of 2.35 
accidents per 100,000 flight hours to 1.73 per 
100,000 hours during 1979-86. 
A few negative results have also occurred. 
The recent tendency for airline consolidation 
was not expected by many advocates of 
deregulation. As of the middle of 1987, a 
handful of the major trunklines was coming 
to dominate air traffic and passenger com-
plaints about flight delays and lost luggage 
were rising. The structure of the industry is 
still evolving, and the long-term effects of the 
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merger movement on price and service have 
yet to be determined by the newly-unleashed 
competitive forces. Moreover, airlines 
remain subject to the scrutiny of the federal 
government's antitrust authorities. 
For the railroads, revenue per ton-mile (a 
good measure of unit cost) has been declin-
ing in recent years while volume (total ton-
miles) and operating income have increased. 
In the case of trucking, comprehensive data 
are harder to come by. Nevertheless, 65 per-
cent of a large sample of shippers recently 
reported lower trucking rates and improved 
services. The number of new firms entering 
the industry has far exceeded the loss of 
older companies. The number of ICC-
authorized carriers increased from 18,000 in 
1980 to 33,000 in 1984. 
Reduced regulation-ranging from out-
right deregulation to simplification and 
streamlining of rule-making-has enabled 
the competitive process to work better. 
Depositors in financial institutions have 
been receiving higher returns on their 
money, as a greater variety of companies 
compete for their business. Long-distance 
telephone users find that greater competi-
tion has resulted in lower rates, while subsi-
dies to local service have been eliminated. 
Inevitably, the wrenching changes brought 
about by deregulation have generated 
counter-pressures from interest groups that 
have lost government protection. Managers 
of many deregulated firms have seen their 
pay and perquisites decline to the competi-
tive norm. Some companies have been unable 
to survive in the new competitive environ-
ment and have gone bankrupt or have been 
acquired by stronger firms. 
But, clearly, the economy as a whole has 
benefited. All economic reform involves tran-
sitional costs, which often seem to outweigh 
the benefits at first. Deregulation's score-
card, however, has shown nothing but pluses 
from the start. 
The public interest would be served by 
another wave of economic deregulation and 
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by renewed emphasis on reducing the bur-
den of social regulation. In the area of eco-
nomic deregulation, the Interstate 
Commerce Commission and the Federal Mar-
itime Commission should follow the CAB 
into the graveyard for regulatory commis-
sions. The consumer would be far better pro-
tected by competitive forces in the 
marketplace. Also, the remaining vestiges of 
energy price regulation should be repealed, 
along with the various quotas on imports. 
Restrictions on exports should be reduced 
only to instances that truly involve the 
national security. 
Simultaneously, a fundamental revision of 
the statutory framework for social regula-
tion should be undertaken. Unreasonable 
goals (such as "zero discharge") and unrealis-
tic timetables (such as those governing gaso-
line usage) should be modified or, better yet, 
eliminated. Much more use should be made 
of market-based approaches, such as effluent 
fees in lieu of detailed "clean" water regula-
tions. 
Perhaps the most fundamental need is to 
help the public understand the limits of gov-
ernment rule-making. Even if it were staffed 
entirely with Newtons and Einsteins, the 
Consumer Product Safety Commission could 
not effectively regulate the 2 million com-
panies producing the 10,000 products within 
its jurisdiction-nor could the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency clean any significant 
portion of the water, air, and land in and 
around the United States. The need is not for 
greater compassion, commitment, or techno-
logical expertise-those we have in abun-
dance. What is required now is the 
willingness and the courage to make difficult 
choices among the many alternative 
demands for government regulation of pri-
vate activity. 
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